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Abstract 
Sense of agency—a feeling of control over one’s actions and their outcomes—might include at least 
two components: free choice over which outcome to pursue, and motoric control over the action 
causing the outcome. We orthogonally manipulated locus of outcome choice (free choice/instructed) 
and motoric control (active/passive), while measuring the perceived temporal attraction between 
actions and outcomes (“temporal binding”) as an implicit marker of agency. Participants also rated 
stimulus intensity.  Actions caused higher or lower levels of either painful heat, or mild electro-tactile 
stimulation. We found that both motoric control and outcome choice contributed to outcome binding. 
Moreover, free choice, relative to instructed action, attenuated high intensity outcomes, but only when 
participants made an active movement. Thus, choosing, not just doing, influences temporal binding 
and perceived sensory magnitudes, though in different ways. Our results show these implicit measures 
are sensitive both to voluntary motor command and instrumental control over action outcomes. 
Keywords: action selection; temporal binding; pain; sense of agency; sensory attenuation; tactile; 
voluntary action 
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Choosing, Doing, and Controlling: Implicit Sense of Agency over Somatosensory Events 
Voluntary action is accompanied by a “sense of agency”—the feeling of initiating and 
controlling one’s own actions and their sensory outcomes. The delay between a movement and its 
outcome is perceived as shorter when the movement is voluntary than when it is involuntary—an 
effect sometimes called “intentional binding” (Haggard & Clark, 2003; Haggard, Clark, & Kalogeras, 
2002). This temporal binding effect consists of two dissociable components: a shift in the perceived 
time of the action forward towards the outcome (“action binding”) and a shift in the perceived time of 
the outcome backward towards the action that caused it (“outcome binding”; Haggard, Clark, & 
Kalogeras, 2002; Wolpe, Siebner, Haggard & Rowe, 2013). Temporal binding occurs even without 
voluntary action, for example, when judging the time of an external event with a sensory consequence 
(Buehner, 2012; Buehner & Humphreys, 2009). Nevertheless, comparing an agentic condition to an 
appropriate non-agentic control condition reveals a component of binding attributable to intentional 
action, over and above other factors. This intentional component of binding has been proposed as one 
implicit marker of agency (Haggard, 2008).  
The concept of agency includes two forms of control. First, agents select which outcome to 
pursue. Second, they use motoric control to initiate the action that triggers the outcome. The former 
component, outcome selection control, has received limited attention in the temporal binding 
literature. Binding increases with reliability of outcome timing (Haggard et al., 2002) and probability 
of outcome occurrence (Moore & Haggard, 2008). Moreover, top-down (false) beliefs about control 
over outcome timing influence binding (Desantis, Roussel, & Waszak, 2011). On the other hand, one 
study found no effect of control over outcome identity (i.e., which of two tones was triggered by the 
action) on binding (Desantis, Hughes, & Waszak, 2012). However, that study used neutral outcomes 
without any particular meaning to participants, making action selection arbitrary.  
In a novel design, we orthogonally manipulated choice over outcome identity (free or 
instructed) and motoric action initiation (active or passive) to investigate how each factor contributes 
to temporal binding, while keeping outcome identity entirely predictable across conditions. To make 
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the choice of outcome meaningful, we used pain as a motivationally significant outcome. Previous 
studies that used valenced outcomes found less temporal binding for negative outcomes than for 
positive or neutral outcomes (Takahata et al., 2012; Yoshie & Haggard, 2013). Moreover, voluntary 
cognitive control should normally select actions that minimize pain. We therefore expected stronger 
temporal binding when choosing actions that cause less pain, rather than more pain. 
Sensory attenuation has also been proposed as an implicit measure of agency (Blakemore, 
Frith, & Wolpert, 1999). Compared to passive movements, voluntary actions reduce the perceived 
intensity of sensory events simultaneous with (Williams, Shenasa, & Chapman, 1998) or caused by 
the movement itself (e.g., Blakemore et al., 1999; Wang, Wang, & Luo, 2011). Whether sensory 
attenuation and intentional binding reflect the same underlying processes is an important, unresolved 
question in agency research (Hughes et al., 2013). A previous study found no relation between inter-
subject differences in temporal binding and sensory attenuation (Dewey & Knoblich, 2014). However, 
a relation between these two measures might be more apparent at the single-trial level. 
We measured temporal binding in blocked conditions where either a voluntary action or a 
passive movement was followed by a higher or lower intensity heat-pain stimulus. By comparing 
binding in passive and active movement conditions, we could isolate the specific part of binding 
attributable to voluntary motor commands, while controlling for other factors that influence the 
perceived interval between events. Locus of outcome choice was also manipulated. In some blocks 
participants chose for themselves which outcome level they would receive, while in other blocks the 
experimenter chose for them. By comparing free choices with instructed trials, we could isolate the 
specific part of binding attributable to free selection of outcomes. To test whether any effects were 
specific to meaningful (i.e., heat-pain) outcomes, we tested higher or lower intensity non-painful 
electro-tactile stimuli in a separate group of participants. On each trial, participants reported the time 
of either their action or the outcome, and rated stimulus intensity. We considered action and outcome 
binding separately, because there are both theoretical reasons to expect dissociation, and experimental 
evidence that such dissociations occur (e.g., Desantis et al., 2011; Wolpe et al., 2013). 
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Considering that the pre-reflective sense of agency could reflect both choice over outcomes and 
motoric execution, we predicted that voluntary action and free choice would enhance temporal 
binding, compared to passive movement and instructed action. Furthermore, we expected that highly 
painful stimuli would decrease binding compared to less painful stimuli, and to non-painful tactile 
stimuli. We also assessed the contributions of motoric action control and outcome choice to perceived 
sensory magnitude. Finally, we looked for a relation between binding and sensory attenuation across 
trials. 
Method 
Participants 
A power calculation in G*Power 3.1 (Faul, Erdfelder, Lang, & Buchner, 2007) indicated that 
40 participants would be needed to achieve a power of 0.80, with a 2 x 2 x 2 x 2 mixed factors design 
and estimated effect sizes (ηp2) of .38 to .61 for action-related manipulations of intentional binding 
(Haggard & Clark, 2003; Haggard et al., 2002) and .23 to .53 for valence-related manipulations of 
temporal binding (Takahata et al., 2012; Yoshie & Haggard, 2013). Therefore, 40 neurologically 
healthy adult participants (20 males, Mage = 25.4 years, SDage = ±5.3 years) with normal or corrected-
to-normal vision were recruited to participate in the study. They provided written informed consent 
prior to the experiment and were paid £7.50 per hour. Two participants opted not to complete the 
experiment during threshold determination, so they were replaced with other volunteers. The 
experiment was approved by the UCL Research Ethics Committee, and carried out in accordance with 
the provisions of the World Medical Association Declaration of Helsinki. Half of the participants 
received noxious radiant heat stimulation as an outcome and the other half received non-noxious 
electro-tactile stimulation. 
Apparatus and Materials 
A laptop computer running LabVIEW 2012 (National Instruments, Austin, Texas, USA) was 
used to run the intentional binding task, trigger the outcome stimuli, and collect participants’ 
responses. The computer display was located 60 cm in front of the participant. Noxious radiant heat 
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stimulation was delivered to the left hand dorsum by an infrared CO2 laser stimulation device with a 
wavelength of 10.6 µm (SIFEC, Ferrières, Belgium). The laser pulse (100 ms duration) was 
transmitted via an optic fiber to reach a spot diameter of 6 mm. These laser pulses selectively excite 
Aδ- and C-fibers without co-activating lower-threshold Aβ-fibers in the dermis. Tactile stimulation 
with a duration of 10 ms was delivered using a Digitimer DS5 constant current stimulator (Digitimer 
Ltd., Welwyn Garden City, UK) connected to a pair of disposable press-stud electrodes (Biosense 
Medical, Chelmsford, UK) placed on the dorsum of the left hand. 
Procedure 
For each participant that received radiant heat stimulation, we identified the Aδ threshold for 
“pinprick pain” using ascending-descending-ascending staircases. The threshold was identified as the 
stimulus temperature that elicited reports of pinprick sensation and a reaction time (RT) less than 650 
ms (Churyukanov, Plaghki, Legrain, & Mouraux, 2012; Mouraux, Guerit, & Plaghki, 2003). Starting 
at 38°C, the temperature was increased in steps of 4°C until the RT was less than 650 ms. Then the 
temperature was decreased in steps of 2°C until the RT became longer than 650 ms. Finally, the 
temperature was increased in steps of 1°C until the RT was less than 650 ms again, and the participant 
reported a pinprick sensation for 3 consecutive repetitions of the same temperature (M = 48.6°C). We 
then set the low stimulus intensity at 2°C above pinprick threshold, and the high stimulus intensity at 
8°C above pinprick threshold. Participants were familiarized with the high and low levels of 
stimulation. Then they practiced rating sensory magnitude on a visual analog scale from 0 (‘no pain’) 
to 100 (‘worst pain imaginable’). To help participants use the scale, they were instructed to consider 
the average perceived intensity of the lower stimulus as a 25 on the scale, and the average perceived 
intensity of the higher stimulus as a 75. 
In the group that received electro-tactile stimulation, each participant’s detection and pain 
thresholds for electrical stimulation were measured prior to the experiment. Starting at 0.5 mA, the 
current was increased in steps of 0.5 mA until the participant detected the stimulus. The current was 
then reduced in 0.5 mA steps until the stimulus was no longer detected, and then increased again until 
the stimulus was again perceived. This last value was taken as the detection threshold. Next, the 
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current was increased rapidly until the participant reported that the stimulus had started to feel 
uncomfortable. This value was taken as the near-pain threshold. To find the pain threshold, the current 
was increased in steps of 0.5 mA until the participant reported that the stimulus felt painful. The 
current was then reduced in 0.5 mA steps until the stimulus was no longer painful, and then increased 
again until the stimulus was once again felt as painful. This value was taken as the pain threshold. The 
low and high levels of stimulation for the main experiment were then set to 45% and 55%, 
respectively, of the range between the detection and pain thresholds. These levels were chosen based 
on a pilot study in a separate group of volunteers which indicated that this difference between high 
and low electro-tactile intensities would match the discriminability of the high and low heat-pain 
stimuli. The mean difference between the high and low intensities was 1.05 mA (range = 0.55-1.15 
mA). Participants were familiarized with the high and low levels of stimulation. Then they practiced 
rating sensory magnitude on a visual analog scale from 0 (‘no sensation’) to 100 (‘maximum non-
painful sensation’). To help participants use the scale, they were instructed to consider the average 
perceived intensity of the lower stimulus as a 25 on the scale, and the average perceived intensity of 
the higher stimulus as a 75. 
At the beginning of each trial in the operant blocks, either the experimenter (in “instructed” 
blocks) or the participant (in “free choice” blocks) chose the stimulus level the participant would 
receive on that trial (high or low). Then a clock appeared on the screen, and the clock hand began to 
rotate. Participants fixated the clock. In “active movement” blocks, participants pressed the key 
corresponding to the previously chosen stimulus intensity (F4 for high intensity, or F5 for low 
intensity) at a time of their own choice. In “passive movement” blocks, the experimenter pressed the 
participant’s finger instead. The outcome stimulus was delivered 250 ms after the keypress. The clock 
hand continued to rotate for a short time, and then stopped. Then participants used the keyboard to 
report either the time of the action or the time of the outcome stimulus, depending on the block. 
Afterwards, a visual analog scale from 0-100 appeared on the screen, and participants rated sensory 
magnitude as practiced earlier in the session (Fig. 1).  
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Fig. 1.  
Schematic of experimental design and trial structure. Please refer to the text for further explanation. 
In “instructed” blocks, the experimenter ensured that equal numbers of low and high intensity 
stimuli were delivered. In “free choice” blocks, participants were allowed to choose the level of 
stimulation they would receive on a given trial, but they were told that they had to select equal 
numbers of high and low intensity stimuli in each block. To help participants do this, they were given 
feedback about the distribution of their choices twice during each block: once after either 8 or 12 
trials, and again at the end of the block. All participants complied with instructions. 
In baseline action judgment blocks, the action (F4 or F5; free choice or instructed; active or 
passive movement) was not followed by an outcome stimulus. Participants reported the time of the 
action, but did not provide sensory magnitude ratings. In baseline outcome judgment blocks, no 
actions were made. A visual cue presented at the beginning of each trial indicated the level of heat-
pain or electro-tactile stimulation to be delivered. Stimulation began 2000-4000 ms after the onset of 
the trial. Participants reported the time of the stimulus, and rated stimulus intensity. 
Action binding and outcome binding were measured in separate sessions on different days. 
The threshold was taken at the beginning of each session. In total, 13 blocks (4 operant action 
judgment blocks, 4 operant outcome judgment blocks, 4 baseline action judgment blocks, and 1 
baseline outcome judgment block) were run. Operant action judgment, operant outcome judgment, 
and baseline action judgment conditions each consisted of one active movement/free choice block, 
one active movement/instructed block, one passive movement/free choice block, and one passive 
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movement/instructed block. Each block contained 20 trials. Block order was counterbalanced across 
participants along the motoric execution control and locus of outcome choice factors. Stimulus level 
varied within blocks. Two of the action baseline blocks were done at the beginning of the action 
binding session, and the other two were done at the end of that session, in a counterbalanced order. 
The outcome baseline block was done at either the beginning or the end of the outcome binding 
session (counterbalanced across participants). 
Results 
Intentional binding can be broken down into two separate measures: action binding and 
outcome binding. Action binding is the difference in the perceived time of the action when it is 
followed by an outcome (operant condition) compared to when it is not (baseline condition). Outcome 
binding is the difference in the perceived time of the outcome when it is caused by the participant’s 
action (operant condition) compared to when it is not (baseline condition). To calculate action and 
outcome binding, the mean difference between the participants’ time judgments and the actual time of 
the action/outcome in each baseline and operant condition is computed (Tables S1 and S2). Then the 
mean error in the baseline condition is subtracted from the mean error in the operant condition to 
account for any time perception biases unrelated to the operant action-outcome relationship. In 
particular, note that this subtraction removes baseline differences between the timing of the electro-
tactile stimuli (10 ms square-wave pulses) and the radiant heat-pain stimuli (100 ms pulses with a 
gradual ramp-up to the target temperature). Because of these differences, participants perceived the 
heat-pain stimuli as occurring later in time than the electro-tactile stimuli in both baseline outcome 
judgment and operant outcome judgment blocks (Table S2). Importantly, differences in the perceptual 
latency for the two types of stimuli do not contribute to our inferences, because the perceptual latency 
in the baseline condition was subtracted from that in the operant condition to provide a measure of 
binding. 
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Action binding  
A mixed factors analysis of variance (ANOVA) with the between-subjects factor stimulus 
modality (pain, tactile), and the within-subjects factors stimulus level (high, low), motoric execution 
control (active movement, passive movement), and locus of outcome choice (free choice, instructed) 
was run on action binding. There was a trend towards a main effect of motoric execution control, F(1, 
38) = 3.93, p = .055, ηP2 = .09, with more binding for active movements (M = 35.5 ms, 95% CI = 
[21.3, 49.6]) than for passive movements (M = 8.8 ms, 95% CI = [-16.4, 34.0]; Fig. 2). No other main 
effects or interactions approached significance (Table S4). 
Outcome binding 
A mixed factors ANOVA with the between-subjects factor stimulus modality (pain, tactile), 
and the within-subjects factors stimulus level (high, low), motoric execution control (active 
movement, passive movement), and locus of outcome choice (free choice, instructed) was run on 
outcome binding. Note that more negative values indicate greater outcome binding. There was a main 
effect of motoric execution control, F(1, 38) = 6.01, p = .019, ηP2 = .14, with more binding for active 
movements (M = -208.1 ms, 95% CI = [-251.9, -164.3]) than for passive movements (M = -172.9 ms, 
95% CI = [-215.3, -130.5]). There was also a main effect of locus of outcome choice, F(1, 38) = 6.50, 
p = .015, ηP2 = .15. Binding was stronger in the free choice condition (M = -207.3 ms, 95% CI = [-
250.4, -164.3]) than in the instructed condition (M = -173.7 ms, 95% CI = [-216.1, -131.3]; Fig. 2). 
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Fig. 2.  
Effects of motoric execution control and locus of outcome choice on action binding (left) and 
outcome binding (right). The dashed lines indicate the perceived time of the action and the outcome in 
the corresponding baseline condition. The broken vertical line indicates a false zero for outcome 
binding. The solid portions of the outcome binding bars are drawn to scale from a value of -100 ms. 
Moreover, there was a main effect of stimulus modality, F(1, 38) = 5.18, p = .028, ηP2 = .12, 
with more binding for non-painful electro-tactile stimuli (M = -236.1 ms, 95% CI = [-293.5, -178.8]) 
than for painful heat stimuli (M = -144.9 ms, 95% CI = [-202.2, -87.5]). There was also an interaction 
between stimulus modality and stimulus level, F(1, 38) = 5.44, p = .025, ηP2 = .12 (Fig. 3). We 
explored the origin of this interaction using simple effects tests. This showed less binding for high 
intensity heat-pain stimuli (M = -117.1 ms, 95% CI = [-172.0, -62.3]) than for low intensity heat-pain 
stimuli (M = -172.6 ms, 95% CI = [-244.0, -101.3]), F(1, 38) = 4.16, p = .048, ηP2 = .10. There was no 
difference in binding between the high level (M = -253.3 ms, 95% CI = [-308.1, -198.4]) and the low 
level (M = -219.0 ms, 95% CI = [-290.3, -147.7]) of electro-tactile stimulation, F(1, 38) = 1.58, p = 
.216, ηP2 = .04. No other main effects or interactions were significant (Table S5). 
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Fig. 3.  
Effects of outcome stimulus level and modality on action binding (left) and outcome binding (right). 
The dashed lines indicate the perceived time of the action and the outcome in the corresponding 
baseline condition. 
Non-intentional contributions to temporal binding 
The main purpose of our study was to look at aspects of temporal binding related to two key 
components of intentional action, specifically, motoric execution control and locus of outcome choice. 
However, non-intentional factors such as causal relations between actions and outcomes can also 
contribute to temporal binding, and may indeed account for the bulk of the perceived temporal 
compression between events (Buehner, 2012; Buehner & Humphreys, 2009; Cravo, Claessens, & 
Baldo, 2009). In fact, we observed some temporal binding even in a completely non-agentic condition 
of our experiment, where participants controlled neither motoric execution nor outcome choice 
(passive, instructed condition; Fig. 2). To formally examine these non-intentional contributions to 
action and outcome binding, we used one-sample t-tests to compare action binding and outcome 
binding in the entirely non-agentic (passive movement, instructed action) condition to 0 (i.e., no 
change in time estimation error between baseline and operant conditions). We found that this non-
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intentional part of action binding was not statistically significant, t(39) = 1.08, p = .288, Cohen’s d = 
.17 (M = 13.1 ms, 95% CI = [-11.5, 37.8]). We did, however, find significant non-intentional outcome 
binding, t(39) = -6.24, p = .0000002, Cohen’s d = -.99 (M = -156.7, 95% CI = [-207.5, -105.9]). 
Sensory magnitude ratings (operant blocks) 
A five-way mixed factors ANOVA with the between-subjects factor stimulus modality (pain, 
tactile), and the within-subjects factors block type (operant action judgment block, operant outcome 
judgment block), stimulus level (high, low), motoric execution control (active movement, passive 
movement), and locus of outcome choice (free choice condition, instructed condition) was run on 
sensory magnitude ratings. Note that block type was included as a nuisance variable rather than a 
factor of interest. There was a main effect of stimulus level, F(1, 38) = 409.81, p < .00001, ηP2 = .92, 
confirming that participants indeed perceived the higher intensity stimulus as more intense (M = 61.7, 
95% CI = [58.3, 65.0]) than the lower intensity stimulus (M = 24.1, 95% CI = [22.3, 26.0]) in both the 
painful heat and innocuous electro-tactile stimulation conditions. An interaction between stimulus 
modality and stimulus level was found, F(1, 38) = 9.34, p = .004, ηP2 = .20. Simple effects tests 
showed that the high level of heat-pain (M = 65.3, 95% CI = [60.6, 70.1]) was rated higher than the 
high level of electro-tactile stimulation (M = 58.0, 95% CI = [53.3, 62.7]), F(1, 38) = 4.92, p = .033, 
ηP2 = .11, while the low level of heat-pain (M = 22.1, 95% CI = [19.5, 24.8]) was rated lower than the 
low level of electro-tactile stimulation (M = 26.1, 95% CI = [23.5, 28.8]), F(1, 38) = 4.72, p = .036, 
ηP2 = .11. That is, participants perceived a greater difference in intensity between the high and low 
levels of heat-pain than between the high and low levels of electro-tactile stimulation 
There was also an interaction between stimulus level and locus of outcome choice, F(1, 38) = 
7.28, p =.010, ηP2 = .16. Simple effects tests showed that the high levels of stimulation were perceived 
as more intense in the instructed condition (M = 62.1, 95% CI = [58.8, 65.4]), than in the free choice 
condition (M = 61.2, 95% CI = [57.8, 64.7]), F(1, 38) = 6.02, p =.019, ηP2 = .14. The low level of 
stimulation was perceived as equally intense in the instructed condition (M = 23.8, 95% CI = [21.9, 
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25.8]) and the free choice condition (M = 24.4, 95% CI = [22.6, 26.3]), F(1, 38) = 0.07,  p = .791, ηP2 
= .002. 
In addition, there was a three-way interaction between stimulus level, locus of outcome choice, 
and motoric execution control, F(1, 38) = 14.73, p = .0005, ηP2 = .28. Simple effects tests showed that 
the interaction between stimulus level and locus of outcome choice described above was only present 
when participants executed an active movement to exert their outcome choice, F(1, 38) = 28.23, p < 
.0001, ηP2 = .43, and not when the experimenter passively moved their finger, F(1, 38) = 0.94,  p = 
.340, ηP2 = .02 (Fig. 4). High levels of stimulation were perceived as less intense when they were 
freely chosen by the participant and produced by an active movement, compared to when the 
participant was merely instructed to actively press the key producing a high level of stimulation, F(1, 
38) = 6.48, p = .015, ηP2 = .15. There was no difference between free choice and instructed conditions 
when a passive movement produced the high level of stimulation, F(1, 38) = 0.06, p = .802, ηP2 = 
.002. In contrast, low levels of stimulation were perceived as more intense when freely chosen and 
produced by an active movement, compared to when the participant was instructed to press the key 
producing a low level of stimulation, F(1, 38) = 20.35, p < .0001, ηP2 = .35. Again, there was no 
difference between free choice and instructed conditions when a passive movement produced the low 
level of stimulation, F(1, 38) = 2.29, p = .138, ηP2 = .06. 
Running head: CHOOSING, DOING, AND CONTROLLING 15 
 
Fig. 4.  
Mean sensory magnitude ratings on a visual analog scale (0-100), showing the significant interaction 
between stimulus level, locus of outcome choice and motoric execution control. Error bars show 
standard error of the mean. * =  p < .050; ns = not significant 
Finally, there was a three-way interaction between block type, stimulus modality, and motoric 
execution control, F(1, 38) = 5.92, p = .020, ηP2 = .14, and a four-way interaction between block type, 
stimulus modality, stimulus level, and locus of outcome choice, F(1, 38) = 8.49, p = .006, ηP2 = .18. 
These interactions do not represent effects of interest, and are not discussed further. No other main 
effects or interactions were significant (Table S6). (See Table S3 for the mean sensory magnitude 
ratings in all experimental conditions.) 
Sensory magnitude ratings (baseline blocks) 
The above analysis of sensory magnitude ratings includes only the ratings from the operant 
blocks, in which the outcome stimulus was caused by an action. However, participants also rated 
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sensory magnitude in outcome baseline blocks, where no action was made, but the outcome stimulus 
was preceded by a visual cue indicating whether it would be high or low. To analyze sensory 
magnitude ratings from the outcome baseline blocks, we performed a two-way mixed factors analysis 
of variance (ANOVA) with the between-subjects factor stimulus modality (pain, tactile) and the 
within-subjects factor stimulus level (high, low). There was a main effect of stimulus level, 
confirming that participants rated the high-intensity stimuli (M = 60.2, 95% CI = [56.2, 64.2]) as more 
intense than the low-intensity stimuli (M = 23.2, 95% CI = [20.9, 25.5]), F(1, 38) = 294.02, p < 
.00001, ηp2 = .89. There was also an interaction between stimulus level and stimulus modality, F(1, 
38) = 4.81, p = .035, ηp2 = .11. There was a trend toward the high level of heat-pain stimulation (M = 
63.5, 95% CI = [57.8, 69.1]) being rated as more intense than the high level of electro-tactile 
stimulation (M = 57.0, 95% CI = [51.4, 62.7]). On the other hand, the low level of heat-pain 
stimulation (M = 21.7, 95% CI = [18.5, 24.9]) was rated slightly lower than the low level of electro-
tactile stimulation (M = 24.8, 95% CI = [21.5, 28.0]). However, simple effects tests did not show a 
significant effect of stimulus modality at either the high stimulus level, F(1, 38) = 2.63, p = .113, ηp2 = 
.06, or the low stimulus level, F(1, 38) = 1.84, p = .183, ηp2 = .05. 
Predicting temporal binding from sensory magnitude ratings across trials 
We used linear mixed effects models to predict action binding values from sensory magnitude 
ratings at the single-trial level. Mean-centered sensory magnitude ratings, stimulus modality (dummy 
coded: pain = 1, tactile = 0), motoric execution control (active = 1, passive = 0), and locus of outcome 
choice (free choice = 1, instructed = 0) were modeled as random effects. We used conditional t-tests 
(Wald tests) to test the marginal significance of each effect in the model. None of the factors were 
significant predictors of action binding, although the motoric execution control effect approached 
significance (β = 25.02, SE = ±12.98), t(3116) = 1.93, p = .054 . Importantly, sensory magnitude 
ratings did not predict action binding, t(3116) = 1.66, p = .097 (Table 1). 
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Table 1. Summary of random effects in the linear mixed effects model of action binding. 
Random effect 
Coefficient (ms)a 
DF t p 
Mean SE 
(Intercept) 16.78 ±14.23 3116 1.18 .238 
Sensory magnitude rating (mean-centered) 0.25 ±0.15 3116 1.66 .097 
Stimulus modality (pain = 1, tactile = 0) -13.75 ±12.39 38 -1.11 .274 
Motoric execution control (active = 1, passive = 0) 25.02 ±12.98 3116 1.93 .054 
Locus of outcome choice (free choice = 1, instructed = 0) -2.01 ±6.84 3116 -0.29 .769 
aPositive coefficients indicate greater action binding. 
We also modeled outcome binding values using the same linear mixed effects model design as 
for action binding. Stimulus modality was a significant predictor (β = 124.49, SE = ±39.04), t(38) = 
3.19, p = .003, with less outcome binding for heat-pain than for electro-tactile stimuli. (Note that a 
more positive coefficient indicates less outcome binding, because a shift of the outcome towards the 
action corresponds to a negative value.) Motoric execution control was also a significant predictor (β 
= -33.87, SE = ±14.28), t(3121) = -2.37, p = .018, with more binding of outcomes produced by active 
movements, compared to passive movements. Finally, locus of outcome choice was a significant 
predictor (β = -33.70, SE = ±13.24), t(3121) = -2.55, p = .011, with more binding when the outcome 
stimulus level was chosen by the participant rather than by the experimenter. Sensory magnitude 
ratings did not predict outcome binding, t(3121) = -0.07, p = .947 (Table 2). 
Table 2. Summary of random effects in the linear mixed effects model of outcome binding. 
Random effect 
Coefficient (ms)a 
DF t p 
Mean SE 
(Intercept) -215.26 ±30.04 3121 -7.17 <.0001 
Sensory magnitude rating (mean-centered) -0.03 ±0.50 3121 -0.07 .947 
Stimulus modality (pain = 1, tactile = 0) 124.49 ±39.04 38 3.19 .003 
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Motoric execution control (active = 1, passive = 0) -33.87 ±14.28 3121 -2.37 .018 
Locus of outcome choice (free choice = 1, instructed = 0) -33.70 ±13.24 3121 -2.55 .011 
aNegative coefficients indicate greater outcome binding. 
Discussion 
 We replicated previous studies showing stronger temporal binding for voluntary movements 
than passive movements (Haggard & Clark, 2003; Haggard et al., 2002). We also found stronger 
outcome binding when participants could choose the outcome level, even when the outcome was 
achieved by the experimenter passively moving their finger. This suggests that a process of voluntary 
action selection, or inverse model, contributes to temporal binding, along with other components such 
as the voluntary motor command (Wolpert, Ghahramani, & Jordan, 1995), and non-agentic 
components such as causal relations between events (Buehner, 2012; Buehner & Humphreys, 2009; 
Cravo, Claessens, & Baldo, 2009). A contribution of choice to temporal binding has been proposed 
before (Barlas & Obhi, 2013; Chambon, Wenke, Fleming, Prinz, & Haggard, 2013). However, our 
study provides the first evidence that the locus of outcome choice (free vs. instructed) affects temporal 
binding, irrespective of outcome identity predictability or motoric control over the action itself. In 
principle, our outcome choice effect could reflect top-down beliefs about one’s ability to control 
outcomes through action selection (Desantis et al., 2011) rather than the process of action selection 
itself. Our study cannot distinguish these possibilities. However, one priming study found that 
manipulations of action selection fluency can directly alter explicit agency judgments, without top-
down mediation by beliefs (Wenke, Fleming, & Haggard, 2010). 
Other research has suggested that binding is not affected by outcome identity prediction 
(Desantis et al., 2012). Our effect of outcome control is not at odds with this finding, as stimulus 
intensity was completely predictable in both the free choice and the instructed conditions. Rather, our 
effect depended upon whether participants could choose the stimulus level for themselves, or whether 
the experimenter chose for them. We thus demonstrate a novel effect of the locus of outcome choice 
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on temporal binding, even when outcome predictability was matched between free choice and 
instructed conditions. 
Buehner and colleagues (Buehner, 2012; Buehner & Humphreys, 2009) have suggested that 
temporal binding results from causality, and is not specific to the experience of agency. Another study 
found that both voluntary action and causality were necessary for temporal binding (Cravo et al., 
2009). Our data further support the idea that causality contributes to temporal binding. We found 
substantial outcome binding (but not action binding) in a purely causal but non-agentic condition, 
when the experimenter chose the outcome level, and caused the outcome by pressing the participant’s 
passive finger. The presence of outcome binding in an entirely non-agentic condition stresses the 
importance of using careful control conditions that isolate intentional components of temporal binding 
when using binding as an implicit agency measure. 
We also found that more intense stimuli reduced outcome binding, but only when outcomes 
were painful. High pain levels have a more negative valence than lower pain levels. Intentional 
binding is often reduced for negatively-valenced outcomes (Takahata et al., 2012; Yoshie & Haggard, 
2013), providing an implicit analog to the self-serving attribution bias (e.g., Bradley, 1978; 
Greenberg, Pyszczynski, & Solomon, 1982; Mezulis, Abramson, Hyde, & Hankin, 2004). The tactile 
stimulation, on the other hand, was less valenced. Alternatively, the reduction in outcome binding for 
high intensity heat-pain stimuli could be a direct consequence of stimulus intensity. Participants rated 
the high heat-pain stimuli as more intense than any of the other outcomes. Intense stimuli are highly 
salient, and act as anchors for timing judgments. The perceived time of such anchors is relatively 
uninfluenced by other events, such as preceding actions (Wolpe et al., 2013). Our high heat-pain 
stimuli may have shown relatively little binding either because of their high perceived intensity, or 
because of their negative valence. 
Finally, we found that free choice over outcomes attenuated perceived sensory magnitudes, 
relative to an instructed condition, but only for high intensity stimuli. A further three-way interaction 
with motoric control showed that this effect was present for active but not passive movements.  
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Therefore, it could reflect a specific variant of sensory attenuation previously reported following 
voluntary actions (Blakemore et al., 1999; Wang et al., 2011; Williams et al., 1998). Interestingly, 
another recent study showed that sensory attenuation effects are intensity-dependent (Reznik, Henkin, 
Levy, & Mukamel, 2015). Previous studies of sensory attenuation did not manipulate locus of 
outcome choice and motoric control independently, as we have done here. Our study suggests that 
sensory attenuation of outcomes reflects, at least in part, the ability to choose the outcome through 
voluntary action. However, we found no main effect of motoric control on sensory magnitude ratings 
(i.e., no sensory attenuation effect, as classically defined). Therefore, our results may reflect a 
different form of “sensory attenuation” that primarily depends upon instrumental control over action 
outcomes through free choices, rather than the mere presence of a voluntary motor command. Future 
research should investigate whether these effects are distinct or overlapping. 
Several studies have reported that painful stimuli feel less intense when they are cued than 
when they are unexpected (e.g., Carlsson, Andersson, Petrovic, Petersson, Öhman, & Ingvar, 2006; 
Crombez, Baeyens, & Eelen, 1994). Thus, agentic control over noxious stimuli might reduce pain 
levels by enhancing stimulus predictability. However, our participants always knew in advance which 
stimulus level they would receive. Further, the attenuation of self-chosen stimuli was only found 
when participants themselves initiated the action, and not when they were passively moved. This 
suggests that our “sensory attenuation” effect resulted from free choice over outcome intensity, rather 
than mere predictability. 
Across trials, we found no association between sensory magnitude ratings and either action or 
outcome binding. This extends Dewey and Knoblich’s (2014) finding of no relation between binding 
and sensory attenuation across participants. Though caution is required in interpreting null results, 
both findings appear to challenge the idea that sensory attenuation and temporal binding reflect a 
single underlying cognitive process. However, we found that both temporal binding and perceived 
sensory magnitude were sensitive not only to voluntary motoric control over an action, but also to 
instrumental control over action outcomes through free choice. To recap, we found main effects of 
motoric control and outcome choice on outcome binding, and an interaction effect between these 
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factors on sensory magnitude ratings. Thus, both measures reflect key components of agency, based 
on a theoretical definition of agency as involving both choosing what to do, and actually doing it.  
However, the absence of strong trial-by-trial association suggests that binding and sensory magnitudes 
may not reflect a common cognitive process. 
One limitation of our study was the constrained nature of “free” choices.  Participants were 
asked to choose equal numbers of high and low intensity stimuli in each block. If we had allowed 
participants to make entirely free choices, they presumably would always have chosen lower intensity 
stimuli when those stimuli were painful. Locus of outcome choice and stimulus level would then be 
confounded in the heat-pain condition. We instead allowed participants to control the distribution of 
high and low intensity outcomes in each block. This arrangement constrains endogenous choice in the 
long run, but allows endogenous processes to contribute to the generation of individual actions. 
Together, our findings show that temporal binding and perceived sensory magnitudes are 
influenced by motoric execution control and by the ability to select between alternative action 
outcomes. This supports the idea that binding and sensory attenuation, with appropriate non-agentic 
controls in place, may be implicit markers of the sense of agency, as they are sensitive to two key 
agency components, namely, the voluntary motor command and instrumental control over the action 
outcome. However, we found no relation between action or outcome binding and sensory magnitude 
ratings across trials, suggesting that they are not entirely consistent measures of the implicit sense of 
agency.  
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